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PARTIAL ASSIGNMENTS IN MISSOURI*
General usage of partial assignments in business and com-
merce attests to their convenience. Yet, because of a series of
odd confusions, Missouri courts, in contrast to practically all
other courts in the United States, have consistently held that
partial assignments are not enforceable except in a few rare
circumstances. A brief outline of the history of the assignability
of choses in action, an analysis of the Missouri law on partial
assignment and a comparison of that law with that prevailing
in other jurisdictions should make clear that Missouri's law is
aptly called backward.
HISTORY
A) The Total Assignment
The history of the transfer of choses in action shows that they
have become increasingly assignable. In the early common law
choses in action were not assignable, because the relation be-
tween the original obligor and obligee was regarded as a vital
contractual part of the obligation, which could not be changed.1
However, for practical reasons chancery at an early stage recog-
nized the validity of an assignment of a chose in action; after
receiving notice of the assignment, the debtor was regarded as
owing the debt directly to the assignee. 2 Eventually, during the
18th century, the assignment became enforceable at law; the
assignee was allowed to sue in the name of the assignor by em-
ploying the fiction of a, power of attorney.3 The law courts so
completely took over this field that with a few exceptions the
equity courts, finding that the assignee was adequately protected
at law, refused to receive any suits brought by him.4 Now the
assignee is generally recognized as the legal owner of the claim
or chose in action. 5 And under many modern codes he is allowed
* Much help has been derived in the preparation of this note from an
unpublished thesis by Milton Moldafsky, entitled "Partial Assignments of
Choses in Action in Missouri." Many of his ideas have been incorporated
into this paper; however, the writer takes full responsibility for the work,
and has expressed different opinions on a number of points.
1. 2 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1936) 1166, §405; Ames, The In-
alienability of Choses in Action (1912) 1 Sel. Ess. in Anglo-American
Legal History 580; reprinted in Lectures on Legal History (1913) 210.
This discussion and the development of the law is discussed in Cook, The
Alienability of Choses in Action (1916) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 816.
2. Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action (1916) 29 Harv. L. Rev.
816, 821 and note 6.
3. Id. at 821 and 822.
4. Id. at 822 and 823.
5. Id. at 828 et seq.
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to sue in his own name.6 In Missouri, the assignee is in this way
given complete protection.7 Thus, Missouri courts may be said
to follow the modern and progressive method of treating total
assignments.
B) The Partial Assignment
The history of the recognition of partial assignments of choses
in action in many respects parallels that of the total assignment.
Yet, although the common law came to recognize a total assign-
ment of a chose in action, it refused to recognize a partial assign-
ment, because a chose in action was not allowed to be split into
two or more enforceable claims.8 The common law doctrine was
6. See Clark, Code Pleading (1928) 100 et seq., and cases cited there.
In code states the statutes require all actions to be brought in the name
of the "real party in interest." See R. S. Mo. (1939) §849. "The effect
of our new code of practice, in abolishing the distinction between law and
equity, is to allow the assignee of a chose in action to bring suit in his
own name, in cases where, by the common law, no assignment would be
recognized. In this respect, the rules of equity are to prevail, and the
assignee may sue in his own name." Walker v. Mauro (1853) 18 Mo. 564,
565-566.
7. See note 6, supra. See Clark, The Real Party in Interest Statute in
Missouri (1914) 4 Law Ser. Mo. Bull. 3, 18 et seq.
8. It is important to distinguish between the total assignment and the
partial assignment. In a situation in which A assigns the entire chose
to B, who is to turn over a portion of the proceeds to A when he (B)
enforces the claim, there is in effect a total assignment as far as the collec-
tion of the claim is concerned. B is the owner of the entire claim and after
collection becomes trustee of A's share of the proceeds. The true partial
assignment occurs in a situation in which B, the assignee, is authorized
to demand from the debtor directly, payment of his share only, and not
payment of the whole. It is this latter situation which will be referred
to by the use of the words, "partial assignment," in this paper. Often
mistakenly referred to as a partial assignment is the case in which A
is to collect the entire chose in action and pay over a part of what he
collects to B. Here, there is no assignment at all, but merely an equitable
lien on the claim when collected. Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1936)
1283, §441.
Since no basis existed for permitting the assignee to collect the entire
obligation, the fiction of the power of attorney successfully used in up-
holding the validity of total assignments at common law could not be
applied to partial assignments. In addition, the assignee could not sue for
his partial share of the chose in action, because the common law declined
to permit a chose in action to be split into two or more enforceable parts.
Mandeville v. Welch (U. S. 1820) 5 Wheat. 277. Common law rules regulat-
ing the joinder of parties were inflexible and would not permit an assignee
to join with the assignor in a suit brought in the assignor's name, even
though it was manifest that the suit was brought for the benefit of the
assignee. If the common law courts had admitted that the partial assignee
had legal ownership of a portion of the claim, it would be either a joint
ownership or an ownership in common with the assignor. Joint ownership
had incidents which were not adapted to the end sought; and if the assignor
and assignee were tenants in common, each had a separate interest. Thus,
on the basis of common law principles they could not join. In addition, to
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first stated in the United States in Mandeville v. Welch., Mr.
Justice Story, speaking for the Supreme Court, held that to per-
mit a partial assignee to sue at law would allow a creditor to
harass his debtor by a multiplicity of actions, thus permitting
him to accomplish indirectly that which he is not permitted to
do directly, i. e., to divide the cause of action. This would violate
the contract, for such a deviation was not contemplated by the
debtor in his agreement with his creditor. It is noteworthy,
however, that under the modern theory of novation the partial
assignee may sue at law provided the debtor has consented to the
assignment." The Missouri courts have gone this far in recog-
nizing the partial assignee, and, as is discussed in a subsequent
section, they have progressed very little further.
As in the case of the total assignment, the effect of the harsh
rule of the law courts laid down in Mandeville v. Welch was
mitigated by equity. Under its elastic procedure, which per-
mitted all parties interested to be brought before the court, and
which settled the liability of the debtor in one proceeding, the
reasons for not allowing a partial assignment at law disap-
peared. 13 In equity the debtor did not suffer any added cost or
hardship because of the partial assignment. As one court said:
The debtor can bring the entire fund into court, and run
no risks as to its proper distribution. If he be in no fault,
no costs need be imposed upon him, or they may be awarded
in his favor. If he be put to extra trouble in keeping sepa-
rate accounts, he can, if it is reasonable, be compensated
for it. 1'
maintain the position that the partial assignee was the legal owner of a
part of the claim would subject the debtor to an indefinite multiplication of
claims. Consequently, the common law courts refused to allow the enforce-
ment of partial assignments.
9. (U. S. 1820) 5 Wheat. 277.
10. Judge Story used the following language: "A creditor shall not be
permitted to split up a single cause of action into many actions, without
the assent of his debtor, since it may subject him to many embarrassments
and responsibilities not contemplated in his original contract. He has a
right to stand upon the singleness of his original contract, and to decline
any legal or equitable assignments by which it may be broken into frag-
ments. When he undertakes to pay an integral sum to his creditor, it is no
part of his contract that he shall be obliged to pay in fractions to any
other persons." Mandeville v. Welch (U. S. 1820) 5 Wheat. 277, 288-289.
11. See 2 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1936) 1285, §442. The cause of
action is not on the assignment, but on the promise of the debtor to pay the
partial assignee.
12. See notes 26 and 44, infra.
13. See cases cited, Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1936) 1287, §443,
note 5.
14. National Exchange Bank V. McLoon (1882) 73 Me. 498, 505, 40
Am. Rep. 388.
Washington University Open Scholarship
After the debtor had notice of the partial assignment, an equi-
table duty was imposed upon him to pay the assignee the extent
of his interest in the chose in action and to pay the assignor the
remainder, which was the extent of the latter's interest.'5 This
duty arose regardless of the acquiescence of the debtor. It was
enforceable in a suit brought by the assignee provided he joined
the assignor and any other partial assignees as plaintiffs." In
effect, this equitable doctrine gave to the assignor and assignee,
respectively, their separate interests. With the exception of Mis-
souri and two or three other states, this result has been obtained
in all jurisdictions in the United States and in England, although
somewhat different theories have been used to justify it. 17
Just as the common law finally took over the protection of the
total assignee from equity, so in the United States the courts
under modern codes have come to protect the partial assignee.
In reliance on "real party in interest" clauses in civil proce-
dure statutes, a few courts permit the partial assignee to join
with the assignor in a suit at law. 8 Where all interested par-
ties are brought before the court, the common law objection
is obviated, because the whole matter is settled in one suit, and
the debtor is not subjected to the hardship of a multiplicity of
suits, or to the inconvenience of having to pay in parts. 9 More-
15. See note 13, supra.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., and see Dulles v. Crippen Mfg. Co. (C. C. 1907) 156 Fed. 706;
In re Macauley (D. C. E. D. Mich. 1907) 158 Fed. 322; City Nat'l Bank v.
Friedman (Ark. 1933) 62 S. W. (2d) 28; Schwartz v. Messinger (1897)
167 Ill. 474, 47 N. E. 719; National Exchange Bank v. McLoon (1882) 72
Me. 498, 505; Campbell v. Hildebrandt (1887) 68 Tex. 22, 3 S. W. 243, 246,
2 Am. St. Rep. 467. See also 6 C. J. S. 1088, §40; (1932) 80 A. L. . 413 and
cases cited; Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1936) 1287, §443, note 5. See
also note 19, infra. The theory that the partial assignment is an equitable
charge or lien is also argued. For discussion, see Dickinson, Gratuitous
Partial Assignments (1921) 31 Yale L. J. 1, 12-13. It has also been called
an equitable property interest. Chase National Bank v. Sayles (1926) 11
F. (2d) 948, 48 A. L. R. 207; 3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th ed.
1918) 1280 and cases cited.
18. Evans v. Durango Coal Co. (1897) 80 Fed. 433 (applying Colorado
code); Gaugler v. Chicago Ry. Co. (1912) 197 Fed. 79 (applying Montana
code); Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver R. Co. (1913) 44 Utah 26, 137 Pac.
658. See Cook, The Alienability of Choses in Action: A Reply to Professor
Williston (1917) 30 Harv. L. Rev. 449, 482, especially note 108. The partial
assignee may intervene in an action by the assignor against the debtor.
Wells v. Crawford (1912) 23 Colo. App. 103, 127 Pac. 914. The essential
feature is that all parties be before the court. 2 Williston, Contracts (Rev.
ed. 1936) 1287, §443; Restatement, Contracts (1932) §156. Note that most
states still consider this action the modern code equivalent of an equitable
action. Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1936) 1287, §443.
19. See note 13, supra. 2 Moore, Federal Practice (1938) 2054, and
cases cited in notes 18 and 19. There is some disagreement as to whether
1941] NOTES
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol27/iss1/12
110 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 27
over, while a complaint by a partial assignee alone is almost
universally held to state no cause of action, the New York courts
under their modern code have modified this rule. Under the New
York view, if the debtor does not take advantage of the defect
by a motion to correct the pleadings, he waives it.20 The New
York position is justified under its modern code of procedure
because new parties may be added at any stage of the action at
the request of either party; and where any person who is a
plaintiff in interest refuses to be joined as plaintiff, he may be
made a party defendant. 21 The New York doctrine may be said
to be the last word in the development of the law of partial
assignments.22
MISSOURI LAW OF PARTIAL ASSIGNMENT
A) The Establishment of the Rule
In spite of the logical and pragmatic sanction of the view per-
mitting a suit in equity or an action at law by the partial as-
signee, Missouri has refused to recognize the partial assignee's
the partial assignee may sue the debtor who paid the assignor subsequent
to notification of the partial assignment. The prevailing view permits re-
covery on the theory that the partial assignee has an equitable right against
the debtor which is not extinguished by the payment to the assignor. See
2 Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1936) 1290, §444, note 3 for cases, and
1289, note 2 for the minority view. See also Williston, Is the Right of an
Assignee of a Chose in Action Legal or Equitable? (1916) 30 Harv. L. Rev.
97, especially 104 et seq. A few courts hold that a trust is created, the
debtor becoming trustee for the assignee. Smith v. Bates Machine Co.
(1899) 182 Ill. 166, 55 N. E. 69; City Nat'l Bank v. Friedman (Ark. 1933)
62 S. W. (2d) 28. Williston, Contracts (Rev. ed. 1936) 1289, §444. Restate-
ment, Trusts, Mo. Annot. (1930) §16. If the debtor is compelled by thejudgment of the court to pay the partial assignor the entire debt, he is
not held liable to the partial assignee, since obviously it would be a hardship
upon him to require him to pay any part of the debt a second time. See
Shenandoah Valley R. R. v. Miller (1885) 80 Va. 821, 833.
The courts of Kentucky and Wisconsin hold that a partial assignment
is not enforceable even in equity. Henry Clay Fire Ins. Co. v. Denker (1927)
218 Ky. 68, 290 S. W. 1047. (See criticism of case in Note (1938) 26 Ky.
L. Rev. 250) ; Skobis v. Ferge (1899) 102 Wis. 122, 78 N. W. 426; Dugan v.
Knapp (1900) 105 Wis. 320, 81 N. W. 412; Thiel v. John Week Lumber
Co. (1908) 137 Wis. 272, 118 N. W. 802; Black Hawk State Bank v. Kinzler(1927) 194 Wis. 20, 215 N. W. 433. But see Pease v. Landauer (1885)
63 Wis. 20, 22 N. W. 847; Baillie v. Currie (1897) 95 Wis. 500, 70 N. W.
660. See, for general discussion, Note (1932) 80 A. L. R. 413, 428.
20. Farmers' etc. Ins. Co. v. Lane Construction Corp. (1925) 212 App.
Div. 528, aff'd (1926) 244 N. Y. 523, 155 N. E. 881. Notice that Utah has
adopted the same principle. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Denver, etc. R. R.
(1913) 44 Utah 26, 137 Pac. 653.
21. See Clark, Code Pleading (1928) 105, 106 for discussion of this rule;
2 Moore, Federal Procedure (1938) 2054 and 2055; Restatement, Contracts
(1932) §156.
22. Ibid.
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right to sue either in equity or at law. Love v. Fairchild23 was
the first case in which the Missouri Supreme Court, relying on
Mandeville v. Welch, refused to recognize the partial assignee at
law. In the case of Burnett v. Crandall,24 the court, acting as a
court of equity, relied upon Mandeville v. Welch to state that
partial assignments were not enforceable even in equity without
the consent of the debtor. A number of courts in other states
made the same error; they did not limit the holding of the
Mandevil4 e case to law.2 5 The case of Burnett v. Crandall is re-
lied on by the Missouri courts as the leading authority.2 How-
ever, it may be argued that the doctrine that partial assignments
were not enforecable without the debtor's consent in Missouri
was expressed by way of dicta. The claim upon which Burnett
sued was not liquidated at the time the case was decided, and
was declared, therefore, not to be assignable. The court had
confidence in this ground for its decision, and relied primarily
on it; it was dubious of the correctness of its statement that a
partial assignment was not valid in equity.27 The court also failed
28. (1850) 13 Mo. 300, 53 Am. Dec. 148.
24. (1876) 63 Mo. 410. In this case the assignor was joined as a party
defendant. The assignor had settled with the debtor, and had promised to
save him harmless from action brought by the assignee.
25. For example, Weinstock v. Bellwood (1876) 75 Ky. 139. See also
Note (1927) 13 Corn. L. Q. 129.
26. The following cases follow it as the leading authority: Beardslee v.
Morgner (1880) 73 Mo. 22; Loomis v. Robinson (1882) 76 Mo. 488; Fourth
Nat'l Bk. v. Noonan (1885) 88 Mo. 372; Johnson County v. Bryson (1887)
27 Mo. App. 841; Turner v. Lord (1887) 92 Mo. 113; Rice v. Dudley (1889)
84 Mo. App. 383; Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Wright (1889) 38 Mo. App. 141;
Alexander v. Grand Avenue Ry. (1893) 54 Mo. App. 66; Leonard v.
Missouri, K. & T. R. R. (1896) 68 Mo. App. 48; Kiddoo Bros. v. Ames &
Robins (1898) 73 Mo. App. 667; Bland v. Robinson (1910) 148 Mo. App.
164, 127 S. W. 614; Swift & Co. v. Wabash R. R. (1910) 149 Mo. App.
526, 131 S. W. 124; Pickett & Sexton v. School Dist. of Kansas City (1916)
198 Mo. App. 519, 186 S. W. 533; Halvorson v. Commerce Trust Co. (Mo.
App. 1920) 222 S. W. 897; Taylor v. Dollins (1920) 205 Mo. App. 246,
222 S. W. 1040; Howard Undertaking Co. v. Fidelity Life Ass'n (Mo. App.
1983) 59 S. W. (2d) 746; Stewart v. Kane (Mo. App. 1938) 111 S. W.
(2d) 971; Subscribers, etc. v. Kansas City Pub. Ser. Co. (1936) 230 Mo.
App. 468, 91 S. W. (2d) 227. See Wabash B. B. v. Bowring (1903) 103
Mo. App. 158, 171, 77 S. W. 106, 109; Boyer v. Hamilton (1886) 21 Mo.
App. 520, 524; Turner v. Lord (1887) 92 Mo. 113, 117, 4 S. W. 420, 421.
See Restatement, Contracts, Mo. Annot. (1933) §156. See Clark, Real Party
in Interest Statute in Missouri (1914) 4 Law Ser. Mo. Bull. 3, 16, 17, where
the Missouri rule is attacked. See Service Purchasing Co. v. Brennan
(1931) 226 Mo. App. 110, 42 S. W. (2d) 39 where it was held that an
assignment of 5 days' wages already earned but not payable until the end
of two weeks, was not a partial assignment.
27. The court expressed itself as follows: "Here 'the obligation to pay
the assignor' had never been admitted, nor was the judgment, at the time
the compromise was effected, a 'liquidated demand capable of being en-
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to perceive completely the importance of the protection which
equity was peculiarly able to give the debtor. The extent of the
court's confusion is indicated in the following quotation:
The learned judge and accomplished author who delivered
the opinion in Mandeville vs. Welch * * * would seem to
have expressed a somewhat different view in his admirable
work on Equity Jurisprudence (2 Sto. Eq. Jur., §1044);
but it will perhaps be found, on close examination of the
authorities cited in the margin in support of the text, that
they scarcely give sanction, in all its broadness, to the idea
that a creditor, in ruthless disregard of the wishes or inter-
ests of his debtor, may divide and assign the debt into as
numerous portions as there are dollars in the indebtedness,
and yet successfully appeal to a court of conscience to coun-
tenance and enforce such oppressive and inequitable trans-
fers. For if you once grant the premise that a creditor,
without the consent of his debtor, may split and assign the
debt into two portions, you thereby pave the way for the in-
evitable corollary that no bounds can be fixed or limits as-
signed, in this regard, to the creditors gracious option. Themind of every just man might well hesitate before adhering
to such a doctrine, however sustained by precedent or forti-
fied by authority.28
Beardslee v. Morgner,29 the second case which came before the
Supreme Court of Missouri involving a partial assignment, is
frequently cited for the same proposition stated in Burnett v.
Crandall. However, it was actually decided upon a pleading
question; the court found that since the plaintiffs had filed three
petitions which were each insufficient, plaintiffs should have had
judgment automatically rendered against them under section
3540,of the Missouri statutes.30 The supreme court stated only
forced in a court of justice,' for the bond was given, appeal taken and
cause pending in this court. What might have been the ultimate result
of such appeal, it is impossible now to determine, and therefore the whole
matter was manifestly one remaining to be settled 'by negotiation or suit
at law.' This shows very plainly that this case falls within the principle
of the rule laid down by Mr. Justice Miller, and consequently fully author-
izes and gives validity to the compromise which Geiss, without Crandall's
consent, effected. So that should it be urged that our conclusion as to the
first point considered was incorrect, still our second conclusion, supported
as it is by high authority, remains intact." Burnett v. Crandall (1876) 63
Mo. 410, 417.
28. Burnett v. Crandall (1876) 63 Mo. 410, 413-414.
29. (1880) 73 Mo. 22.
30. Now R. S. Mo. (1939) §948, which reads thus: "If a third petition
* * be filed and adjudged insufficient * * * no further petition
shall be filed, but judgment shall be rendered."
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by way of dicta that a partial assignment is not enforceable
without the debtor's consent because the debtor has "the right
to discharge his debt as an integer, and not otherwise, unless he
so desires."' 3' However, in the circumstances of this case, there
was no danger of the debtor's having to pay twice. Each of the
plaintiffs held a note of the defendant. In order to consolidate
their suits against the defendant, their mutual debtor, each had
assigned the other a half interest in the note of defendant held
by him. Thus, actually all interested parties were before the
court; two valid suits were amalgamated into one; all this should
be convenient for the debtor. The appellate court realized that
the sense of the rule laid down in, the Crandall case (viz., the
avoidance of a multiplicity of suits and of payment in multiple
parts) manifestly did not apply to facts such as these. The
appellate court, having first decided that the defendant had
waived his rights under section 3540 of the code, held that a
partial assignment under these circumstances was valid.3 2 The
supreme court, in overruling the appellate court, did not bother
to contest the latter court's arguments against the application of
the rule making partial assignments unenforceable, but accepted
explicitly the authority of Burnett v. Crandall.3 Thus, the two
first cases establishing the Missouri rule against partial assign-
ments are poorly reasoned in so far as they consider the rule;
moreover, they state the rule only by way of dicta. In this re-
markable fashion Missouri's peculiar rule became established.
Later cases have uniformly followed the doctrine expressed in
these two cases.34
31. Beardslee v. Morgner (1880) 73 Mo. 22, 25.
32. The court of appeals said: "We do not think, therefore, that thisjudgment should be reversed on the purely technical grounds that these
two plaintiffs are each the holders of half a note. Together, they hold the
whole debt; and the assignment was made, not to create, but to escape, the
mischief which is the only reason of the rule invoked by appellant. * * *
The claim is not really split in this case, but consolidated; and the de-
fendant is not harassed by multiplicity of actions, but two suits against
him are by this means consolidated into one." Beardslee v. Morgner (1877)
4 Mo. App. 141, 144.
33. Thus the supreme court used the following language: "But aside
from the point just referred to, one equally fatal to this appeal confronts
us: Without the consent of the defendant, it was altogether out of the
power of Mary Weiss to assign to her co-plaintiffs one-half of the sum
due her by the note of defendant, and as much beyond their power to
assign to her one-half the sums specified in the notes made payable to them.
The matter was so ruled in Burnett -v. Crandall." Beardslee v. Morgner
(1889) 73 Mo. 22, 25.
34. See cases cited note 26, supra.
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B) Subrogationm
The Missouri courts employ the partial assignment cases as
authority for partial subrogation cases.35 The analogy between
the two situations is perfectly natural. However, because this
analogy has not been seen, many states have reached the follow-
ing confusing result: Though they allow the partial assignee to
sue as the "real party in interest," on joining the assignor, they
do not recognize the partial subrogee as a "real party in inter-
est," and require him both to join the subrogor and to sue in
the latter's name .3  Paradoxically an expression of Judge Dillon
in an early case under the Missouri code is largely responsible
for the fact that the analogy was not accepted in other states.37
The Missouri law is expressed in the recent case, Subscribers
Reciprocal Exchange by Dodson v. Kansas City Public Service
Company.38 In that case the insurance company had paid the
insured all but fifty dollars of the damage suffered in an auto-
mobile collision, under a fifty dollar deductible policy; the in-
sured then gave the defendant, the street car company whose
car had wrecked the insured's car, a release for the entire claim
in exchange for fifty dollars, after the insurance company had
notified the defendant of its right to subrogation. When the
insurance company sued in its own name, the supreme court
held that where only a part of the damages have been paid by
the insurer on an assignable cause of action, such cause of
action can be maintained by the insurer in its own name only
where the defendant consents to the splitting of the cause of
action. 9 Under our Missouri code provision for suit by the
35. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Wabash Ry. (1898) 74 Mo. App. 106;
Howard Undertaking Co. v. Fidelity Life Ass'n (Mo. App. 1933) 59 S. W.
(2d) 746.
36. See Clark, Code Pleading (1928) 112, and cases cited in note 96;
Note (1936) 96 A. L. R. 864, 881 et seq.; 2 Moore, Federal Procedure
(1938) 2055 et seq.
37. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Hannibal & St. T. R. Co. (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1874)
Fed. Cas. No. 96. This case is criticized by Clark, Code Pleading (1928)
111.
38. (1936) 230 Mo. App. 468, 91 S. W. (2d) 227. See Comment (1936)
1 Mo. L. Rev. 285.
39. The court said: "In all other instances [i. e., except where the debtor
has given his consent], suit must be brought in the name of the insured
against the defendant third person who becomes a trustee for the insurer
for the amount recovered in its behalf; and such insurer is not a necessary
party to the action. Anzer v. Humes-Deal Co., 332 Mo. 432, 58 S. W. (2d)
962; McKenzie v. Missouri Stables, 225 Mo. App. 64, 34 S. W. (2d) 136;
Matthews v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 142 Mo. 645, 44 S. W. 802; Fourth
National Bank of St. Louis v. Noonan, supra; Cable v. St. Louis Marine
Ry. & Dock Co., supra; Pickett v. School District of Kansas City, supra;
McLeland v. St. Louis Transit Co., supra; Alexander v. Grand Avenue R.
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"real party in interest," there seems to be little to commend the
decision. In this case, the supreme court does not so much ex-
pound on the extreme injustice to the debtor if the claim is
divided, but rather it relies on the hard and fast rule that only
one cause of action may spring from a single wrongful act tojustify the particular decision. The answer to this argument is
the same as that previously stated: the debtor is completely pro-
tected under the code provisions or equity rule allowing the
joinder of all parties interested in the suit.40 There is then really
one judgment against the debtor, where all parties are before the
court. The better law in subrogation cases is analogous to the
majority view of the law in partial assignment cases. The sub-
rogee is allowed to sue in his own name upon joining the sub-
rogor as a party plaintiff.41 It is interesting to note that this
latest Missouri case conflicts with Hartford Fire Insurance Com-
pny v. Wabash Railway Company ,42 where under very similar
facts, it was held by a court of appeals that since the insured,
after payment of the fifty dollars by the tortfeasor, had been
completely compensated for his damage, there was only a single
claim remaining upon which the insurer could sue in his own
name.4
Co., supra; Poor v. Watson, 92 Mo. App. 88." Subscribers, etc. v. K. C.
Pub. Service Co. (1936) 230 Mo. App. 468, 91 S. W. (2d) 227, 231; See
Illinois Power & Light Corp. v. Hurley (1931) 49 F. (2d) 681, 691, and
cases cited. See also Comment (1922) 7 ST. Louis LAw REuVIw 141, where
Sexton v. Anderson Elec. Car. Co. (1921) 234 S. W. 358 was discussed.
In that case the insurance company was allowed to sue in its own name
in accordance with general American law.
40. See discussion by Clark, Code Pleading (1928) 110 et seq.
41. See Clark, Code Pleading (1928) 110, and cases cited in note 89;
Note (1935) 96 A. L. B. 864, 876 and 881; 2 Moore, Federal Procedure
(1988) 2057 and 2058.
42. (1898) 74 Mo. App. 106. See Comment (1936) 1 Mo. L. Rev. 285,
where it is argued that on these facts the insurer should be considered
the real party in interest.
43. It is questionable whether an insurance company can sue under
Missouri's Workmen's Compensation Act in the name of the insured against
the "defendant third person who becomes a trustee for the insurer for the
amount recovered in its behalf." Cf. Anzer v. Humes-Deal Co. (1933) 332
Mo. 432, 58 S. W. (2d) 962; McKenzie v. Missouri Stables (1930) 225 Mo.
App. 64, 34 S. W. (2d) 136; Sylcox v. Nat'l Lead Co. (1931) 225 Mo. App.
548, 38 S. W. (2d) 497, 501; Superior Minerals Co. v. Mo. Pac. R. B.
(Mo. App. 1932) 45 S. W. (2d) 912, 916. For the employer is subrogated
to the employee's rights against a tort feasor under the act. B. S. Mo.
(1939) §3699. Certainly the insurance company can join with the sub-
rogated employer, or the employee. See cases cited, supra. This would
benefit the insurance company if only these latter could not settle as they
desired.
The insured can sue for his whole damage, although the insurance com-
pany has paid him for part of it. Matthews v. Missouri Pac. By. (1898)
142 Mo. 645, 44 S. W. 802; Matthews v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. (Mo. 1893)
24 S. W. 59.
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C) Consent of the Debtor
The only chance the partial assignee and, it seems, the partial
subrogee have in Missouri is to get the consent of the debtor,
and sue on the theory of novation.44 Such consent has been found
in the following circumstances: payment of an assigned portion
of the debt by the debtor to a previous assignee,45 acceptance of
the partial assignment by the debtor without objection, 4' or an
interpleader of the parties claiming to be the real partial as-
signee.47
A conflict appears in the Missouri cases as to whether a party
other than the debtor can raise the defense that there has been no
acceptance by the debtor of the partial assignment.48  The ques-
tion arises when the debtor interpleads and deposits the fund
into court and both the partial assignee, to whose assignment
there has been no acceptance by the debtor, and a third party,
such as an execution creditor of the assignor or a subsequent
total assignee, claims the fund. Some cases have held that the
debtor is the only one who may object.49 If he does not do so,
and pays the money into court, he waives his objection, and the
partial assignee may recover. Other cases, however, have held
that other parties, such as a subsequent assignee who has ob-
tained the full title or subsequent execution creditors, may raise
the defense." In one of these cases, Pickett and Sexton v. School
44. See, e. g., Fourth Natl Bk. of St. Louis v. Noonan (1886) 88 Mo.
372; Turner v. Lord (1887) 92 Mo. 113; Taylor v. Dollins (1920) 205 Mo.
App. 246, 222 S. W. 1040. Denis v. Grand River Drainage Dist. (1934) 74
S. W. (2d) 58; Stewart v. Kane (Mo. 1938) 111 S. W. (2d) 971.
45. Gordon v. Jefferson City (1905) 111 Mo. App. 23; Halvorson v. Com-
merce Trust Co. (Mo. 1920) 222 S. W. 897. See also Fourth Natl Bk.
of St. Louis v. Noonan (1886) 88 Mo. 372, 377.
46. See note 44, supra. Also see Taylor v. Dollins (1920) 205 Mo. App.
246, 222 S. W. 1040; Friedman v. Griffith (Mo. 1917) 196 S. W. 75, where
the failure of obligor to object within a reasonable time after acceptance
was held to constitute a waiver. This view is criticized by Professor Willis-
ton, who declares, "To give silence the effect of assent to a novation in
the absence of special circumstances seems to enlarge too much the possi-
bility of making contracts by tacit acceptance." 2 Williston, Contracts
(Rev. ed. 1936) 1285, §442.
47. Johnson County v. Bryson (1887) 27 Mo. App. 341, Halvorson V.
Commerce Trust Co. (Mo. 1920) 222 S. W. 897. The court said that the
debtor did not make any objection and the right to object to splitting a
single debt into many is one which the debtor may waive by placing the
money in the court. See also note 49, infra.
48. See notes 49 and 50, infra.
49. Whiteside v. Longacre (1901) 88 Mo. App. 168; Halvorson v. Com-
merce Trust Co. (Mo. 1920) 222 S. W. 897. Cf. Stewart v. Kane (Mo.
1938) 111 S. W. (2d) 971 (a lawyer's lien case). See Dennis v. Grand
River Drainage Dist. (1934) 74 S. W. (2d) 58.
50. Pickett and Sexton v. School District of Kansas City (1916) 193
Mo. App. 519, 186 S. W. 533; Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Wright & Co. (1889)
38 Mo. App. 141.
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District of Kansas City5 the court reasoned thus: Even if in
some circumstances the partial assignee will be recognized, he
will never be allowed to recover at the expense of hardship to the
debtor. Since the subsequent total assignee obtains the whole title,
and gets the legal rights of the debtor, no partial assignment
should be enforced which is against the rights and equities of the
subsequent total assignee. Therefore, the latter's consent would
appear as necessary as the debtor's before him.52 Very much the
same reasoning was used in another interpleader case, Missouri
Pacific Railway Company v. Wright & Co.,53 in order to allow the
attachment creditor with his legally acquired lien to triumph
over the partial assignee, whose rights were still inchoate since
the debtor had not accepted.5 4 This argument and result Willis-
ton terms "monstrous. 55 However, although the result is mani-
festly unfair, because of its complete disregard of the interests
of the partial assignee, yet the conclusion is logically sound, pro-
51. (1916) 193 Mo. App. 519, 186 S. W. 533.
52. The court said: "It should also be observed that even if, in some
circumstances, courts of equity will enforce rights acquired under partial
assignments, they will not enforce them unless they can do so 'without
working a hardship upon the debtor.' 4 Cyc. 29. A fortiori, they will not
enforce such partial assignments to the hardship or against the rights and
equities of a subsequent assignee who has obtained the whole title." Pickett
& Sexton v. School Dist. of Kansas City (1916) 193 Mo. App. 519, 186
S. W. 533, 536.
53. (1889) 38 Mo. App. 141.
54. The court reasoned thus: "It is, however, contended that the filing
of the bill of interpleader, long subsequent to the acquisition of the lien
of the unsuccessful interpleaders on the fund under their process of garnish-
ment, has the effect of an acceptance of the order by the drawee, and
rendered the assignment binding. This contention is discountenanced by
the cases just cited. Surely it cannot be that a bare rudimentary assign-
ment, void in law and equity, can after, the lien of the garnishing creditors
has attached, obtain validity by the filing of a bill of interpleader by
garnishee and thus operate to displace and postpone the liens of the garnish-
ing creditors. If this act is equivalent to the acceptance of the order, at
what time does the lien of such an assignment become operative? From
the date of the order or from the date of the filing of the interpleader?
If from the former it can only be by operation of some fiction of the law,
which does not exist, because at that time it was inoperative as a lien
both in law and equity; and if by the latter, then it was subsequent in
time to the garnishment liens." Mo. Pac. Ry. v. Wright (1889) 38 Mo.
4pp. 141, 148.
55. Williston, Is the Right of a Chose in Action Legal or Equitable?
(1916) 30 Harv. L. Rev. 97, 104 and 105, where Williston said: "It is
almost, if not quite, universally admitted that a partial assignee has merely
an equitable right. If then, the total assignee has a legal right, a subse-
quent total assignment prevails over a prior partial assignment. This
monstrous result has actually been reached on this reasoning, under the
Georgia Code, which is held to give the total assignee legal ownership."
The Georgia case referred to is King Bros. & Co. v. Central of Georgia Ry.
(1910) 135 Ga. 225, 69 S. E. 113.
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vided the initial proposition is accepted that a partial assignment
is unenforceable against the debtor until the latter accepts."
The fact that it is logically sound once more attests to the im-
perative necessity of changing the Missouri doctrine of partial
assignment.
D) Protection of the Lawyer's Fees
Shortly after the case of Burnett v. Crandall,57 which involved
a suit by a lawyer to collect as his fee an assigned portion of a
total judgment against the defendant, the lawyers in Missouri
were successful in having a law passed which protected them
from the unfair Missouri rule against partial assignments. 8 This
statute gave successful plaintiffs' lawyers a lien on the fund owed
by the defendant 9 At the same time, it legalized the contingent
fee.60 Of course, such a contingent fee, without the benefit of
statute, was unenforceable against the debtor, the defendant,
though it was enforceable against the plaintiff, the assignor and
client. This law has relieved a great deal of the hardship of the
rule against partial assignments in Missouri. However, there
seems to be no good reason why the lawyers should have the
benefit of such a statutory rule and not the insurance companies
in subrogation cases nor any innocent person who takes a partial
assignment from his debtor in satisfaction of a debt. 1
CONCLUSION
The modern tendency of the cases, in line with logic, reason,
and good commercial usage, is toward a more complete protec-
56. Whereas Williston uses this bad result to argue that a total assign-
ment should be considered equitable rather than legal, Cook employs it to
contend that the partial assignment should be treated as concurrently
equitable and legal at the time the debtor receives notice of it, under "real
party in interest" clauses of procedure codes. Cook, The Alienability of
Choses in Action: A Reply to Professor Williston (1917) 30 Harv. L. Rev.
449.
57. (1876) 63 Mo. 410.
58. Mo. Laws of 1901, p. 46.
59. R. S. Mo. (1939) §13337, which reads as follows: "The compensation
of an attorney or counselor for his services is governed by agreement, ex-
press or implied, which is not restrained in law. From the commencement
of an action or the service of an answer containing a counterclaim, the
attorney who appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause of
action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision or
judgment in his client's favor, and the proceeds thereof in whosesoever hands
they may come; and cannot be affected by any settlement between the
parties before or after judgment."
60. Mo. Laws of 1901, p. 46; R. S. Mo. '(1939) §13338.
61. The employer in Workmen's Compensation is also protected by being
subrogated to the right of the compensated employee or his dependent
against a tort-feasor, R. S. Mo. (1939) §3699.
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tion of the rights of the partial assignee.6 2 The Missouri law, in
the face of the doctrine of stare decisis, is so well settled that
there is little chance of its being overruled by judicial decision.
Since Erie Railroad v. Tompkins has established the rule that
the state's interpretation of the common law shall prevail, the
importance of making this change has increased.6 3 Therefore,
it is suggested that the legislature adopt a statute allowing a
partial assignee of a chose in action to sue either at law or in
equity. A submitted statute is:
Partial Assignments of Choses in Action Validated
Except where otherwise provided by law, no transfer by
assignment or by subrogation of a part of a chose in action
shall be unenforceable merely because it is an assignment of
a part thereof without the consent of the party liable.
This statute, taken in conjunction with the Missouri Code of
Civil Procedure, should enable the partial assignee of a chose in
action to sue the debtor at law or in equity, by joining the partial
assignor and any other partial assignees as parties plaintiff. If
the partial assignor or other partial assignees refuse to join in
the action, they may be joined as parties defendant. In this
manner, the debtor would be amply protected from a multiplicity
of suits, since all the parties would be before the court. Such a
statute would not only put Missouri in line with the rest of the
country as to the law of partial assignments of choses in action,
but would also rid the state of some unreasonable and undesir-
able law."1
LEONARD E. MARTIN
62. Clark, Code Pleading (1928) 110 et seq.; Restatement, Contracts
(1932) §156; Note (1932) 80 A. L. R. 413. Cook, The Alienability of
Choses in Action (1916) 29 Harv. L. Rev. 816.
63. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins (1938) 304 U. S. 64.
64. These conclusions are in agreement with and partly based upon the
unpublished thesis of Milton Moldafsky.
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